donderdag 13 februari 2014

Syria-Yugoslavian similarities



After reading the article ‘The disturbing parallels between Syria’s civil war and Spain in the 1930s’ by Andreas Whittam Smith (in the Independent, 30 January, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-disturbing-parallels-between-syrias-civil-war-and-spain-in-the-1930s-9096762.html?origin=internalSearch) I felt the need to write down what I noticed earlier. Where Smith is comparing Syria with the Spanish Civil War in the thirties, and focuses on the fate of foreign fighters, I would like to delve deeper into the Balkans of the nineties.

Until the state fell apart in an orgy of violence in the nineties, Yugoslavia was seen as a success story. Although Socialist since the partisans beat the Nazis in the Second World War, Yugoslavia was not aligned with the Soviet bloc. The country had even strong trade, tourist, migration and loan links with the West. The ‘homeland for the South-Slavs’ was blessed with peace for more than fourty years, and nothing seemed to point at the awaiting mayhem. Yugoslavia was a relatively successful dictatorship in the time democracies weren’t that common yet.

I think the ability to unite the Yugoslavs was based on an ideological Nationalism mixed with patronage and Socialism. The diverse histories and religious rites of the Balkan people were overruled by shared traditions, language and – probably most of all – the shared project of a Non-Aligned Socialist Utopia.

Here’s a very interesting map from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1910. Since it’s an ethnic map, there’s no division made in between the South-Slavs, who only vary in religion. Considering the ethnic mosaic the Empire obviously was, this map is even more interesting in the light of what was yet to come.


The Syrian dictatorship was until recently called a prime example of a stable autocracy as well. In the volatile Middle East the cold peace with Israel, a steady flow of tourists and a growing economy seemed unique indeed. After the Imperial powers drew the borders of the modern Middle East after the First World War, the Assads were the first to rule the Syrian state for a prolonged period. Moreover, the Arab Spring seemed to skip Syria initially. Although the Assads are minority Alawites, they seemed able to unite the mosaic of religions and sects in Syria (Druze, Shia, Sunni, Catholic, Armenian-Orthodox, Aramaese-Orthodox, Alawites, Alevis, etc.) by emphasizing the shared Arab identity – ethnically, historically and linguistically. More then anybody else the Alawites knew that it was impossible to unite Syria on anything else than Arabism. There’s simply too many religious variety in this part of the world. As Yugoslavia was the homeland of the South-Slavs, Syria was the centre of the Arab world.


But the world changed, and the dictatorship didn’t. Socialism and Soviet sponsorship left more then twenty years ago already. The region is changing, and more representative rule seems to arise in neighbours like Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq.

The 'successful' mix of Socialism, Nationalism, and patronage, strengthened by (cold) ties with the West, is a striking similarity between the dictatorships of Yugoslavia and Syria. Obviously, there’s many differences. One of the reasons Yugoslavia fell apart was its federal structure. The solidarity of the northern republics wasn’t endless, especially when economic depression hit Europe in the eighties. There was no need for Yugoslav migrant workers any more, as Western European unemployment numbers rose. Tourists didn’t show up any more. In Syria however, there’s no such structure. We’re still far from an independent Kurdistan, Alawite-state and Druze-enclave arising from Syrian territory.

Smith calls the Spanish Civil War a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the Second World War, which it probably was. The Nazis and the Soviets used the warring sides as proxies, and several Western European countries were involved. If the Syrian Civil War is a dress rehearsal, what might we expect than? Will Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia fight each other directly? Will Iran and Turkey claim their regional power, or will the sectarian conflict lead to a conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the Gulf? Obviously the region is on the move - far beyond Syria. Syria was indeed late to join the Arab Spring, but so were the recent events in Turkey and Iran (Rohani). The regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran suffer more and more from a lack of popular support.

In the Balkans however, civil war didn’t lead to a continental war, but to the redrawing of borders and even a reunion with Europe eventually. Almost hundred years after Sykes-Picot, this looks as a way more attractive prospect for the Middle East. It might be possible to contain the Syrian conflict for now, but solving it any time soon might be impossible. However, this comparison might show that things might get better eventually. The darkest scenario doesn’t need to come true.

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